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ABSTRACT 
 
As a Chinese initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a newly 
established multilateral financial institution which addresses the daunting 
infrastructure demands across Asia and furthers interconnectivity and economic 
development through advancement in infrastructure and other productive sectors. 
AIIB is envisaged to be built into a first-class multilateral development institution 
with 21st century governance, to cooperate with and be complementary to existing 
financial institutions. Therefore, this thesis aspires to capture an in-depth 
understanding of the AIIB by answering the questions ‘what is the characteristic of 
the institutional design of AIIB, in comparison with Bretton Woods institutions and 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), and what corresponding role China has played in 
contributing to its institutional design feature?’ This thesis relies primarily on the 
official founding documents of the institutions, applies thematic analysis as data 
analysis method, and further employs key concepts from rational design on 
international institutions including membership, scope, centralization and voting, to 
interpret and analyze data. This thesis finds out that change-through-continuity is a 
recurring characteristic of the AIIB’s institutional design, in which China being a 
revisionist reformist has played a significant role in shaping its characteristic. These 
findings contribute to the conclusion that the change-through-continuity characteristic 
of AIIB’s institutional design is a manifestation of bounded rationality.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENT BANK (AIIB) 
 
1.1  Background and Context 
Initiated and promoted by China, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(hereinafter, AIIB or the Bank) is a newly established multilateral financial institution, 
which is specially tailored to bring countries together to address the daunting 
infrastructure deficits across Asia, and featured by its goal of furthering 
interconnectivity and sustainable economic development in the region through 
advancements in infrastructure and other productive sectors, and stimulating growth 
and improving access to basic services.1 The AIIB has adopted the core principles of 
openness, transparency, independence and accountability, along with the modus 
operandi of being ‘Lean, Clean and Green’.2 
    A few background stages are of importance to understand the initiation, 
establishment and operation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in the 
four years proceeding 2013.  
    Proposal: The original idea for the creation of an “Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank” was initially proposed by Zheng Xinli, the Vice Chairman of the 
China Center for International Economic Exchanges(CCIEE) at the Bo’ao Forum in 
April 2009, to advocate for an optimal use of Chinese foreign currency reserves and 
addressing infrastructure issues in Asian countries against the backdrop of the global 
financial crisis.3        
    Announcement: The AIIB initiative was essentially announced during President 
Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang’s visits to South-East Asia when they collectively 
proposed the AIIB to their hosting nations in October and November 2013.  
   Consultation and Negotiation: Bilateral and multilateral consultations and 
negotiations were subsequently underway in relation to the core principles and major 
elements for the establishment of the bank. There were eight chief negotiators’ 
meetings on the establishment of the Bank in total held to collaboratively engage with 
                                            
1 AIIB https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.html Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB), 2017. About 
AIIB. [online] Available at: < https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.html> [Accessed 10 January 2017]. 
2 Lean means a small efficient management team and highly skilled staff; Clean means an ethical organization 
with zero tolerance for corruption; and green means an institution built on respect for the environment. 
3 Bo’ao Forum, 2009. Expanding Economic Cooperation in Asia, Helping the Globe Get Rid of Crises. [online] 
Available at: <http://english.boaoforum.org/mtzxxwzxen/1966.jhtml> [Accessed 28 March 2017]. 
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the preparatory works, including various operational policies such as public 
information interim policy environmental and social framework, and strategies and 
business plans such as thematic priorities and strategic programming. 
    Inauguration and Operation: On January 16, 2016, the Board of Governors of 
the AIIB convened its inaugural meeting, and declared the Bank open for business, 
and meanwhile Mr. Jin Liqun was elected as the President of the Bank for a five-year 
term.4 Since start of operation, at the time of finalizing my thesis, there are currently 
13 projects approved and 12 projects proposed. 
    Traversing the stages of initial proposal, official announcement, bilateral and 
multilateral consultation, inauguration and operation, the Bank has been garnering 
worldwide sensation, diverse interpretations and investigations.    
 
1.2 Research Question 
In the light of the aforementioned context, the body of research on the Bank is rather 
nascent but increasingly burgeoning, varying from studying the underlying causes and 
conditions of China’s proactive move to establish the Bank, to the Bank’s challenges 
and prospects concerning governance and operation, to the dynamics and potential 
ramifications for international financial architecture, and global economic governance. 
Considering this, there is little academic value in simply replicating the previous 
research. It is therefore of importance for a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis 
of the Bank itself. The aim of this thesis is to investigate and explain the understudied 
but pivot question, namely, the Bank’s institutional design against the backdrop of 
China’s official visions for and roles within it. Two overriding research questions 
are raised: 
 
1) In regards to institutional design, what is the characteristic possessed by 
the Bank, in comparison to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank (narrowly refers to IBRD) and Asian Development Bank (ADB)?  
2) What corresponding role has China played in contributing to the 
characteristic of the Bank’s institutional design against the backdrop of 
Chinese official visions in relation to the Bank? 
                                            
4 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB), 2016. Jin Liqun elected as first President. [online] Available at:  
<https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2016/20160116_002.html> [Accessed 19 January 2017].  
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    There are a series of subordinate questions attached to be raised beforehand as 
well. They include: What are the exact dimensions to be examined in the institutional 
design to observe its design characteristic? What are China’s official visions and its 
underlying social structures in relation to the Bank? To what extent do the 
characteristics of the Bank’s institutional design reflect the Chinese official visions 
and advocacy?  
 
1.3 Research Aim and Contribution 
This thesis aspires to capture a nuanced understanding of what characteristic AIIB 
represents in the aspect of institutional design, through a comparative analysis with 
IMF, World Bank and ADB and China’s corresponding role in shaping its 
institutional design. A sound and comparative inquiry into the Bank’s institutional 
design in the status quo could be conducive to analyzing efficiency and accountability 
of its current operation and governance, also providing the background knowledge for 
possible scenarios regarding its future reform and institution trajectory. In this sense, 
this thesis will be a valuable addition to broaden and deepen up the existing body of 
research in regards to the Bank’s institutional design. 
    It is notable that the majority of existing bodies of research on the Bank lack a 
robust theoretical framework, despite the fact that some studies have generally 
adopted a theory but proceeded in an ad hoc and insufficient manner in the 
subsequent data analysis. Considering this, one of the major contributions of this 
thesis is estimated to offer a more systematic theoretical analysis. 
    Last but not least, the previous research has generally exhibited an inclination to 
approach the Bank in a speculative fashion, and thus the validity and sources of the 
argumentation is not that convincing. Compared with that, the research materials and 
sources are more transparent and accountable when conducting research on the 
Bank’s institutional design, by virtue of the fact that the main research resources, 
including the Articles of Agreement, governance policy, operational policies and 
strategies, and projects information, are accessible, transparent and reliable on the 
official websites of the research subjects. 
 
1.4 Previous Research 
The previous research shall be attentively and thematically reviewed, in order to show 
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how the existing literature paves the way for advancing the analysis of the Bank’s 
institutional design in the forthcoming chapter. There are three thematic strands of 
literature review in close relation to this thesis: 1) underlying accounts and conditions 
of creating AIIB; 2) internal dimensions of AIIB; and 3) manifestation of assertive 
and normative China. 
The underlying accounts and conditions of creating AIIB 
Scholarly interest in China’s underlying motivation for dedicatedly pushing forward 
AIIB, from its initial announcement to successful debut through rally of regional 
support, and the refinement of AIIB’s role and assuagement of outside concerns and 
doubts, has witnessed a surge. It has been widely unscrambled from the lenses of 
China’s domestic political economy, unstable external environment, perceived 
representation or voice gap in the global economic governance along with 
increasingly outspoken grand strategies.   
    From a domestic point of view, Yong Wang offers a broad investigation about 
the rationality of initiating the AIIB in line with the One Belt One Road strategy, by 
arguing that the creation of these initiatives was partially driven by the pressure of the 
ongoing slowing down of economic growth internally, labelled as a ‘new normal’(
),5 and the AIIB is a feasible outlet to digest the problems of overcapacity and 
excessive foreign reserve, by carrying forward international economic cooperation 
projects through infrastructure construction.6 This is a sound argument to reflect the 
side-effects of China’s pains-taking effort in coping with the 2008 global financial 
crisis. However, this view offered by Yong Wang is further enriched by Daniel Chow, 
who argues that the AIIB could be beneficial specifically to China’s massive SOEs 
for successfully bidding for infrastructure projects under the auspices of the China’s 
dominant role in the AIIB.7 Similar to this constraint-solution approach, Chen 
additionally pinpoints another underlying account, namely, utilizing the Bank as a 
proper financial platform to internationalize Chinese currency; Renminbi (CNY).8 
However, this argument still remains contested or at least unclear, due to the bank 
                                            
5 “New Normal” is a concept used by Chinese leaders and economists to describe the ongoing slowing down of 
growth to around 7.0 percent GDP a year as well as the forbidden tasks of transforming the growth model from 
one driven by exports and investment toward one driven by domestic consumption. 
6 Wang, Y., 2016. Offensive for defensive: the belt and road initiative and China’s new grand strategy. Pacific 
Review, 29(3), p. 457. 
7 Chow, D., 2016. Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 49(5). p.1258-1264. 
8 Chen, H.J., 2016. The Comparative Political Economy of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s Development: 
An Analysis of Neo-Institutionalism. Master of Arts. National Cheng Kung University. p.60-62. 
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currently adopting the official currency of payment of the United States of America, 
in accordance with the AIIB Articles of Agreement.9  
    From the view of China’s external environment, Yong Wang argues that the 
AIIB as one element of China’s systematic OBOR strategy, is seen as a response to 
the ‘pivot to Asia’ policy employed by the U.S. and its deteriorating bilateral relations 
with neighboring countries, and a counterbalance for allowing for more strategic 
maneuvering space for China to change to a relatively passive position in coping with 
the accumulative U.S. pressure.10  
    In a similar vein, China’s official perception of its unstable external environment 
is also manifested by its perceived representation or voice gap in the global economic 
governance. On this matter, Daniel Chow has conducted an interesting inquiry by 
arguing that China is perceived as poorly treated and deliberately contained by the 
United Sates and has found no realist possibility of playing an expanded part in the 
IMF and World Bank more commensurate with its economic weight in the global 
economy.11 This argument is closely connected to this thesis, and will be revisited in 
Xi Jinping’s speeches regarding China’s official visions for a more just and 
representative global economic governance in the upcoming methodology chapter.  
     However, this is not to suggest that China’s efforts to establish the Bank have 
gone rather smoothly without any socialization process. On the contrary, establishing 
the Bank has indeed proved to be a mutual-shaping process involving socialization. 
From this point of view, Marcia Don Harpaz theoretically examines the coherence 
and variation in relation to China’s behavior in trade, investment and development 
financing from both a rationalist and normative approach. With respect to the AIIB, 
she argues that a socialization process could be better to understand China’s 
behavioral norm of establishing the AIIB in a sort of conforming yet challenging 
manner to the existing framework.12 Similarly, Xiao Ren also highlights the fact that 
the AIIB’s formation evidently presents a dynamic process of mutually shaping and 
being shaped, reflected by the intensive interaction between China’s determined 
                                            
9 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2015. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of Agreement. [pdf] 
AIIB. Available at: 
<https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-agreement/basic_document_english
-bank_articles_of_agreement.pdf> [Accessed 03 March 2017]. 
10 Wang, Y., 2016. p.458. 
11 Chow, D., 2016. pp.1259-1264. 
12 Harpaz, M., 2016. China’s Coherence in International Economic Governance. Journal of Chinese Political 
Science, 21(2), p.141. 
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efforts of shaping a potentially influential new institution, and China’s refinement of 
the AIIB’s role and assuagement of outside concerns and doubts, in regards to 
China’s veto-power, good governance and standards, and accountability consistent 
with the existing multilateral banks.13 In conclusion, though it entails a process of 
socialization of shaping and being shaped, the efforts taken by China in either way are 
sufficient and compelling enough to denote the fact that China has played a 
significant role in initiating and establishing the Bank. Given this reality, the role 
played by China in shaping the characteristic of the Bank’s institutional design will be 
of value to be further explored and elaborated. 
 
Internal Dimensions of the AIIB 
There are several important internal dimensions of the Bank that have been 
empirically examined. This strand of scholarship has offered some tentative but still 
thought-provoking entry points for further investigating the institutional design of the 
Bank in a more comprehensive and cohesive way.   
    Gregory Chin critically investigates how the AIIB represents both continuity and 
innovation with respect to global governance. More concretely with regards to the 
innovation aspect, the governance structures of AIIB and its overarching legal 
frameworks have constituted a novel foundation and prospect for unlocking the 
potentials for this newly established bank, to make innovative breakthroughs with 
respect to decision-making, management, staffing, and the lending practices and 
business models as well, and thus paving the way to give an adequate voice to 
emerging and developing countries.14  
    More concretely on a micro level, there are some scholarships paid to the AIIB 
membership. Kubalkova notes that the Bank is confronted by monumental challenges 
which are derived from institutional and financial accountability, and its capacity to 
live up to the promises of promoting economic cooperation and integration in the 
Asia-Pacific region, thus divergent membership which allows for well-diversified and 
well-balanced opinions in relation to the operating principles, in which enacted with 
democratic accord and accountability, should be pursued to hold China accountable 
                                            
13 Ren, X., 2016. China as an institution-builder: the case of the AIIB. Pacific Review, 29(3), pp.438-40. 
14 Chin, G.T., 2016. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Governance Innovation and Prospects. Global 
Governance, 22(1), p.12. 
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for its vows of increasing prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, rather than creating a 
Chinese version of ‘golden straitjacket’.15 In a similar fashion, Ming Wang argues 
that with the membership enlargement of the AIIB, an increasing pressure will be 
imposed on Beijing to follow the good extant international practices.16 This strand of 
analysis, shedding light upon the membership trajectory and dynamics by pursuing 
inclusive membership, also entails a socialization process and thus provides insights 
for deepening the membership analysis in the forthcoming chapters. Acknowledging 
the importance of the membership issue, Mullen explores the various underlying 
determinants contributing to different countries’ divergent responses in terms of 
pursuing (or not pursuing) AIIB membership and notices that it is resulted from a 
complex and multifaceted interplay of geo-political and geo-economic interests, 
reflecting the competing and common interests in geography, domestic political 
economy, and institutional clout.17 This analysis presents a very intriguing viewpoint 
in analyzing the uncommitted role played by U.S. in AIIB, when located in the 
context of U.S.-China rivalry.  
 
Manifestation of Assertive and Normative China 
There are several interesting yet complementary framings about the move undertaken 
by China to initiate and establish the Bank. Among them, assertive China and 
normative china are more outspoken in this strand of thematic review.  
  Framing 1: AIIB as an echo of assertive China  
The new leadership assumed power at the 18th National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) in 2012 and the leadership transition was completed in the first 
session of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC). After the transition, China’s 
new president Xi Jinping demonstrated a relatively proactive posture and was quickly 
presented as a powerful leader holding a strong vision and determination for 
achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Prompted by this vision, an 
apparent strategic transformation of China’s foreign strategy from taoguangyanghui 
                                            
15 Kubalkova, P.G., 2015. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: New Asian Opportunity or China’s Hidden 
Strategy? China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, 1(4), pp.667-85. 
16 Wan, M., 2016. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: The Construction of Power and the Struggle for the East 
Asian International Order. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
17 Mullen, A., 2016. Far East of Eden: Determinants of Membership in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
Princeton University. Abstract only. Available at: 
<http://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/handle/88435/dsp01xg94hs00z> [Accessed 18 February 2017]. 
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(keeping a low profile, KLP hereafter) to fenfayouwei (striving for achievement, SFA 
hereafter) was signaled.18 Thus, China’s construction of the Bank became a strong 
showcase of being proactive at a critical historical juncture through deploying the 
material and ideational resources at its disposal.    
    Following the ongoing debate of “Assertive China”, Åberg re-conceptualizes 
Chinese assertiveness and connects it to the Chinese grand strategy of transformation. 
He further elaborates that the recreation of the AIIB is an evident example of Chinese 
assertiveness, anchored in grand strategy of target, cohesion and confidence, which 
stimulates China to SFA, unequivocally signifying China’s status ascendance and 
aspiration by assuming leadership and responsibilities either regionally or globally, in 
despite of U.S. opposition.19 While put differently, the Bank as a strategic power 
move by the rising China vis-à-vis the status quo superpower, is constructed on the 
basis of China’s material and ideational resources, and considered as a self-evidently 
proactive symbol and historical trend, in which institutional development could be 
seen as a functional equivalent engendered by a mixture of interaction comprising 
convergent evolution, political lineage and power acquisition.20  
    An assertive China, in the context of U.S.-China rivalry, also attracts a lot of 
scholarly interest. Firstly, Chow argues that pushing forward the AIIB strongly 
displays Chinese’ policy makers’ frustration with the stalling tactics adopted by the 
U.S. in the reforms for a more just representation commensurate with its economic 
weight in the American-dominated Bretton Woods institutions.21While, Xiao Ren 
presents a dialectical perspective to consider the AIIB, politically and strategically, as 
an offensive initiative for being defensive, when China was confronted with U.S. Asia 
rebalance policy, hence going ‘westward’ to the vast Eurasian heartland and investing 
more resources bear more significant meaning for China’s geopolitical and 
geo-economic status.22 However, these two arguments are more prone to view the 
Bank in a zero-sum game created by China. Though situating the AIIB as one part of 
China’s adjustment about its foreign policy especially related to U.S., differently, 
                                            
18 Yan, X., 2014. From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievements. Chinese Journal of International 
Politics,7(2), p.156. 
19 Åberg, J., 2016. A Struggle for Leadership Recognition: The AIIB, Reactive Chinese Assertiveness, and 
Regional Order. Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, 
2(3), p.1132. 
20 Wan, M., 2016. pp.21-25. 
21 Chow, D., 2016. pp.1258-1260. 
22 Ren, X., 2016. p.436. 
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Yong Wang observes that Beijing has been constantly stressing the dialogue with 
U.S. on building a ‘new model’, namely, major country relations () 
featured by no confrontation, no conflict and win-win situations. From this angle, he 
highlights that the Bank has presented both a challenge and an opportunity to the 
United States-China bilateral relations in the Asia-pacific region.23 
    From a rather U.S.-oriented perspective, Chow argues that the U.S.-perceived 
AIIB could potentially be utilized as a rival to the Bretton Woods institutions, 
concerning lending and rules of international trade in the advancement of its China’s 
global ambitions and goals, such as not in favor of the existing international best 
practices and policies embodied in Washington Consensus, and thus the AIIB marks a 
seismic economic power shift from the United States to China, and there will be 
growing competition regarding who will be the rule-writer for the international trade 
in the 21st century.24 However, standing away from a static point of view, Glaser and 
Vitello have brought an updated observation on the U.S. evolving official discourse 
regarding the AIIB. They argue that thereafter witnessing the initial success of being 
supported by some of its strongest allies, the U.S. started to soften its rhetoric by 
proposing the possible collaboration between the AIIB and existing multilateral 
lenders like World Bank and ADB.25  
    In conclusion, locating the AIIB in the context of U.S.-China rivalry, emphases 
have been put on a mutual adjustment to each side’s policies and strategies. In this 
regard, the AIIB has created a double-side matter of fact, challenge-opportunity, 
assertive-defensive, and cautious-inclusive.     
  Framing 2: AIIB as an echo of normative China 
The significant move taken by China to succeed in establishing the AIIB is viewed as 
a manifestation of China’s nascent normative power in the International financial 
governance landscape. In a nutshell, Peng and Tok have argued that the AIIB is a 
multi-functional platform, embodying Chinese norms such as non-interference, 
non-conditionality and infrastructure construction, which will enhance potential 
influence of social structures with Chinese characteristics in relation to the financial 
governance for promoting reforms in the IMF and World Bank, geared towards a 
                                            
23 Wang, Y., 2016. p.461.  
24 Chow, D., 2016. p.1264. 
25 Glaser, B., Vitello, J., 2015. China Relations: China Makes Strides with AIIB and a Great Wall of Sand. 
Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 17(1), pp.25-26. 
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fairer representation of the developing countries and emerging economies.26 From a 
broader perspective, Emilian Kavalski argues that China’s normative power could be 
interpreted as the very antithesis to European Union (EU) type of cosmopolitanism 
through China’s highlight on its ‘singularly historical practice of universal principles 
that is open to emulation not as a universal pattern, but for its procedures in 
articulating the universal to concrete historical circumstances’. Put differently, 
China’s normative power is premised on specific contexts, an intersection of 
discursive memories of the past combined with the contexts of the present and the 
prospective tasks of the future, rather than explicit norms of appropriateness.27  
    Another strand of normative China is demonstrated by Chinese multilateralism, 
as an underlying principle embedded in the AIIB. Through conducting a comparative 
analysis with American multilateralism, serving the U.S. as a hegemon to consolidate 
global leadership, Bin Gu concludes that Chinese multilateralism for the AIIB is 
characterized by its self-positioning in contributing to a complementary role in 
international development, tilting towards boosting a fairer representation and the 
voices of emerging economies and developing countries.28  
    In a similar fashion yet different approach, Callaghan and Hubbard’s departure 
from the point of the Chinese multilateralism is intrinsically embedded in the AIIB, 
rather stressing that a fruitful exploration of the multilateralism in relation to the AIIB 
could be best situated in the context of its “One Belt One Road” strategy, in which we 
could examine the correlation between the establishment of a multilateral bank 
specially tailored to Asian infrastructure, and China’s intention of de-politicizing the 
potentially fraught bilateral financing deals and boosting its positive image in the 
region. Therefore, he notices that the very necessity and importance for the AIIB to 
function as a truly multilateral institution, in accordance with the standards of other 
multilateral lenders, particularly safeguards, procurement and transparency.29 This 
thematic review of normative China in relation to AIIB is of importance for 
understanding China’s explicit and implicit role in shaping the characteristic of the 
                                            
26 Peng, Z., Tok, S.K., 2016. The AIIB and China’s Normative Power in International Financial Governance 
Structure. Chinese Political Science Review, Issues: Preprints, pp.1-3. 
27 Kavalski, E., 2013. The struggle for recognition of normative powers: Normative power Europe and normative 
power China in context. Cooperation & Conflict, 48(2), pp.252-59.  
28 Gu, B., 2017. Chinese Multilateralism in the AIIB. Journal of International Economic Law, 20(1), pp.137-158.  
29 Callaghan, M., Hubbard, P., 2016. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism on the Silk Road. 
China Economic Journal, 9(2), pp.116-39. 
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Bank’s institutional design against the backdrop of Chinese official normative visions 
and appeals from Xi Jinping’s speeches, to further testify to what extent China’s 
normative appeals have been reflected in the institutional design itself.  
    To briefly conclude, after thematically and critically reviewing the relevant 
literatures, it is arguable that these three thematic strands of previous research are 
interconnected. As shown by figure 1, The underlying accounts, such as China's 
domestic political economy, dynamics of its external environment and perceived 
representation or voice gap, function as strong impetus for China to push the AIIB 
forward to a successful debut regionally and globally. During this process, China’s 
role also involves a process of socialization, in order to make the AIIB more 
transparent and accountable. Overall, China has played an assertive and normative 
role in creating the Bank, which is further testified by the embedded Chinese 
characteristics of multilateralism and non-conditionality in the Bank. This thematic 
literature review denotes a clear logic that China has explicitly and implicitly played a 
significant role in shaping the Bank, and thus lays a foundation for framing the two 
interconnected research questions and proceeding analysis. 
Figure 1. Summary of Previous Research 
  Note: created by the author. 
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CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN  
This chapter aims to elaborate and justify the methodological choices and methods 
applied in this thesis, and demonstrate that the applicability of the selected methods 
goes in accordance with the research aim of this thesis, therefore laying a solid 
foundation to proceed with the author’s argument and provide clarification and 
transparency for the prospective reader. 
 
2.1 Research Strategy and Research Design 
This thesis employs qualitative comparative design as the research strategy, due to its 
appropriateness in providing in-depth analysis and insight for investigating the 
characteristics of the Bank’s institutional design, in contrast with IMF, World Bank 
and ADB. The key value of the comparative design approach is reflected in several 
aspects, such as taking the form of a multi-case study, especially in the field of 
organization studies. This plays a vital role regarding the understanding of causality, 
and allows the distinguishing of similar characteristics of different cases to serve as a 
stepping stone for theoretical reflection.30 In this respect, this thesis also aspires to 
discover the interconnectedness of underlying accounts, and how they could 
contribute to the similarity and difference in the institutional design. This inquiry 
automatically connects to another research question of the thesis, to unveil the 
China’s role in contributing to the Bank’s institutional design against the backdrop of 
Chinese official visions and advocacy. After a systematic analysis, this thesis will 
apply the concept of bounded rationality to better reflect upon the rational 
institutional design theory.   
 
Case selection: Why IMF, World Bank and ADB?  
The goal of purposive sampling is to sample cases/participants in a strategic way, so 
that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed. 
Through a comparative design strategy, the IMF, World Bank and ADB are 
strategically selected on the basis of both theoretical sampling and generic purposive 
sampling. The two sampling approaches attempt to achieve both purposiveness and 
representativeness in relation to case sampling.31 On one hand, the three selected 
                                            
30 Bryman, A., 2012. Social Research Methods. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press. p.74. 
31 Ibid., p.428. 
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cases, together with the AIIB fall into the theoretical toolkit formulated by the 
Rational Institutional Design theory. On another hand, the three cases are of critical 
significance due to the fact that they are the few iconic pillars of the existing 
international financial architecture, upholding governance, transparency and 
accountability and generating huge impacts to the international economic governance 
either in the Asia-Pacific region or worldwide.  
 
2.2 Data Collection  
In this thesis, documents and texts are utilized as the main sources of data, 
encompassing both the primary and secondary data sources in different but 
complementing functions in the data analysis. 
    With respect to institutional design, the primary data derived from the official 
publications, reports, and press releases from the concerning parties, including the 
AIIB, IMF, World Bank and ADB, is publicly available online through their official 
websites and databases. In relation to Chinese official visions for the Bank, the 
primary data is limited to the speeches of Xi Jinping, accessible at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. The official speeches are delimited 
to President Xi Jinping, due to the fact that Xi is the political figure most 
representative of China and his speeches could be seen as the prominent epitomes of 
the official Chinese standpoint. In addition, a spatial-temporal limitation of Xi’s 
speeches has been applied as well. The spatial limitation exclusively lies in bilateral 
and multilateral diplomatic occasions, such as Indonesia’s Parliament, APEC Summit, 
Bo’ao Forum, World Economic Forum, BRICS Summit, and G20 Summit. The 
temporal demarcation is limited to October 2013 onwards, in line with time of the 
Bank being officially announced.  
 
As stressed by Bryman, researchers should take caution and review it as certain 
depiction of social realities, by virtue of their official and quasi-official characters.32 
Equally put, Atkinson and Coffey analyze that documents themselves exhibit a 
distinctive feature, referred as ‘documentary reality’.33 In this regard, we should be 
                                            
32 Ibid., p.550. 
33 Atkinson, P., Coffey, A., 2011. Analyzing Documentary Realities, in: D. Silverman, ed. 2011. Qualitative 
Research: Issues of Theory, Method and Practice. London: SAGE, p79.         
 14 
self-aware of specific socio-political and cultural contexts, in which the depiction of 
reality is generated. This also requires the researchers to attach self-awareness and 
sensitivity of the documents accessed, and this issue will be reexamined and 
addressed in the coming section of ethical considerations and self-reflexivity.  
    Last but not least, the secondary data extracted from the existing coverage of the 
research subject includes the previous research, social media coverage, and various 
reports and publications from think tanks. All the relevant secondary sources will be 
critically analyzed, to cross-check with the primary data, for the sake of mutually 
complementing and reinforcing the credibility and validity of the author’s argument.  
 
2.3 Data Analysis Method: Thematic Analysis 
Considering the two main research questions, this thesis will employ thematic 
analysis as the data analysis method to analyze the collected data. Thematic analysis 
moves beyond simply investigating the co-occurrence of particular explicit words or 
the incidence of particular phrases that are characteristic of particular writing genres, 
and focuses on identifying and describing both the explicit and implicit ideas within 
the data, namely, the themes.34 This feature allows the flexibility of the themes to be 
identified either at a semantic level or at a latent level. Put differently, semantic theme 
attempts to identify the explicit meaning of the collected data through a rich 
description and representation of the data, whereas in contrast, latent theme give a 
resonance about the underlying ideas, norms, and assumptions through an insightful 
interpretation of the data.    
    As argued by Bryman, the thematic analysis is contested for not being 
identifiable, due to the facts that searching for particular themes is seen as a common 
activity that could be discerned in many other qualitative data analysis approaches 
and, for some writers a theme is seen as either too narrow like a code, or too broad, 
transcending everyone.35 In this regard, a clear definition of theme and its relation 
with code should be put forward. Theme shall be considered as a category identified, 
usually built on the codes identified in the data, closely related to the research 
questions and providing a solid basis for the theoretical understanding of the data.36 
                                            
34 Guest, G., MacQueen, K., Namey, E.E., 2012. Applied Thematic Analysis. London: SAGE. p.11. 
35 Bryman, 2012. p.578. 
36 Ibid., p.580. 
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In this sense, we could argue that the code, given to particular pieces of the data, is a 
contributing building block for the particular theme. ‘Framework’, defined as a 
‘matrix based method for ordering and synthesizing data’, is adopted as one practical 
strategy for assisting a thematic analysis, and helps to better construct themes and 
subthemes through a meticulous process of reading and rereading the data.37  
    The rationales for employing thematic analysis in this study lie in two main 
facets: 1) the flexibility of data analysis contingent upon different strands of data and 
research questions, and 2) its strong relevance and linkage to the main theoretical 
concepts outlined in rational institutional design. More specifically, thematic analysis 
will be used to analyze the related institutional documents, such as the AIIB Articles 
of Agreement, IBRD Articles of Agreement, Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, ADB Charter and their respective by-laws. Through the 
first lens, thematic analysis will be applied to comprehend the explicit meaning of the 
institutional documents as they are manifest, instead of interpreting the latent 
meanings, therefore respecting the neutrality of this strand of institutional-related data 
and avoiding intentionally biased comparisons in regards to the characteristic of the 
AIIB’s institutional design in parallel with IMF, World Bank and ADB in the 
forthcoming chapters. Through another lens, the thematic analysis will be critically 
employed to probe both the explicit and implicit meanings of the Chinese leaders’ 
speeches, and categorize them into different themes (and sub-themes) and underlying 
ideas or norms. 
    Specifically, this thesis will entail an attentive reading and appraisal of the 
original documents. For the AOAs, it is rather clear and transparent to outline 
different categories such as Purposes, Membership, Capital, Provisions, Operations, 
Organization & Management, Withdrawal & Suspension, and Immunities & 
Privileges. These categories are seen as succinct codes initially, and are further 
theoretically integrated and constructed as themes, by drawing reference to the main 
analytical concepts employed by rational design on international organizations, 
Membership, Scope, Centralization and Control, in an approach of theoretical 
thematic analysis 38  recognized by David Grey, therefore generating the four 
analytical themes including ‘Membership’, ‘Scope: Infrastructure Investment’, 
                                            
37 Ibid., p.579. 
38 Grey, D., 2014. Doing Research in the Real World. 3rd ed. Los Angeles, London: SAGE. pp.609-611. 
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‘Centralization’ and ‘Control: Voting Arrangement’. As for constructing the theme in 
Xi Jinping’s speeches, please see Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Theme Identification and Construction from Xi Jinping’s Speeches by 
Applying Thematic Analysis 
 
Source: Xi Jinping’s official speeches 
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    As illustrated in Table 1, it is arguably reasonable to get a transparent outline of 
China’s specific visions and its underlying social structures in relation to the Bank, in 
the context of Xi Jinping’s official speeches.  
    Initially starting from the original context to final constructed theme, it is an 
attentive and self-reflexive process of familiarization with the data, outlining three 
highly relevant topics, including ‘AIIB’, ‘Global Economic Governance’ and ‘A 
Community of Shared Future’, and thereafter searching for preliminary, 
comprehensive and candidate codes to finally draw a systematic and coherent theme 
that constructively connects the explicit meaning in tandem with the underlying social 
structures. In this specific case, ‘China’s status’ was initially investigated and 
constructed as an overarching candidate theme. There are several crucial accounts 
contributing to that finding: 1) Xi Jinping actively emphasizes the initiative and 
constructive role played by China in proposing and founding the AIIB, manifested by 
its economic capacity and increasing confidence, indicating China both has the intent 
and capability of successfully engaging itself in a multilateral setting to voice its 
agenda; 2) Xi Jinping elaborates the importance and the necessity of pushing forward 
global economic governance, which should adhere to the principles and values of 
equality, openness, inclusiveness, efficiency and overall stability, while reflecting the 
new realities of the world economic architecture and in this sense, China should take 
the role of being a responsible country in fulfilling its international obligations; 3) Xi 
also entails certain ideational appeals, advocating for all countries’ equal rights, equal 
opportunities and equal rules in the international economic sector, along with respect 
for sovereign-equality and cultural and political diversity and distinctiveness, in the 
framework of a common community of shared future for mankind. These three layers 
of observation denote a status-seeking agenda from China either economically or 
ideationally.  
    In a similar vein, Buzan has argued that China shares several paramount 
principles and values featured by a mixture of traditional Westphalian views of 
sovereignty and non-intervention, desire to preserve distinctive cultural values, top 
priority attached to regime security, and strong commitment to joint development 
through cooperation, trade and investment.39 The further content of the identified 
                                            
39  Buzan, B., 2010. China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible? The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, 3(1), p.14. 
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theme, a reformist revisionist,40 is well-framed by Barry Buzan in the book of 
People, States and Fear: National Security Problem in International Relations. 
Drawing inspiration from Buzan’s definition of reformist revisionist, which is closely 
related to the pluralist approach and only partly accepts some of the institutions of 
international society due to a mixture of calculated and instrumental reasons,41China’s 
multi-attempts to accept, resist and reform the institutions of international society can 
be seen as a theme grounded in the original context of Xi’s speeches. In the light of 
this, the candidate theme is therefore further revised as ‘China’s Status: A Reformist 
Revisionist’, to better explain the manifest and latent meanings of a dual construction: 
1) a liberal and market-based stance on joint development, cooperation and 
interdependence in the economic sphere; and 2) adhering to sovereign equality and 
non-intervention as a means to preserve the uniqueness and diversity in cultural and 
political spheres.42 This particular theme is also echoed by Qin Yaqing’s argument 
that there is an intertwined co-constitution of continuity and change, basically, 
continuity through change in China’s international strategy, illustrating that China’s 
overall strategic design and policies are taking the course of continuity saturated with 
change, in line with its core national interests, including political security, economic 
development and sovereignty.43  
    In light of the aforementioned analysis, the theme ‘China’s Status: A Reformist 
Revisionist’ will provide a very valuable background knowledge to investigate and 
answer the second research question, specifically regarding non-conditionality and 
international character, and China’s vision for democratizing the global economic 
governance.        
 
2.4 Ethical considerations and self-reflexivity 
This thesis goes in accordance with the good research practices and ethical guidelines 
outlined by the Swedish Research Council and also draws a strong attachment to that 
formulated by Alan Bryman.44 In this regard, this study aspires to eliminate the 
                                            
40 Buzan, B., 1991. People, States and Fear. 2nd ed. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. pp.237-46. 
41 Buzan, B., 2010. p. 18. 
42 Buzan, B., 2010. p. 31. 
43  Qin, Y.Q., 2014. Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China’s International 
Strategy. Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7(3), pp.311-314.  
44 See Hermerén, G., 2011. Good Research Practice. Stockholm: The Swedish Research Council, and Bryman, A., 
2012. Social Research Methods. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 
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possibility of incurring in any kind of ethical issue. Therefore, the data collection of 
the research has explicitly excluded interviews and field study, to a large extent, 
avoiding the common ethical issues faced by researchers employing these methods to 
conduct their research. 
    According to Bryman, self-reflexivity is an imperative element and should be 
exhibited to entail a sensitivity to the researcher’s background in terms of political, 
cultural and social contexts, therefore being reflective upon the implications of 
applied methods, biases, values, and decisions for the knowledge generation.45 In this 
regard, as a Chinese student studying the China-led AIIB, the author is well-aware of 
the homogeneity in value, culture and socio-politics and their according biases, and 
should be critical towards cultural native-ness and political biases. A crucial driver for 
conducting this research has been a critical investigation of the Bank’s institutional 
design in comparison with the well-known multilateral financial institutions and how 
the AIIB could potentially evolve as a well-functioning and accountable MDB in the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
45 Bryman, 2012. p.393. 
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CHAPTER 3 RATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
This chapter introduces the relevant theories and concepts that are employed to 
analyze and interpret the data in the thesis. This thesis relies primarily on concepts of 
rational design in the context of international institutions. This chapter starts with a 
general introduction to rational design approach and thereafter elaborates upon the 
four dimensions of institutional design, encompassing membership, scope, 
centralization and control.  
 
3.1 Introduction to rational design on international institution  
    In the past decade, scholarship of international institutions has attentively turned 
to rational design school in an effort to better understand and explain the ample 
diversity observed in the structures and rules that govern these institutions. In contrast 
with the realist and constructivist positions on international organizations, which 
either state that the international institutions are largely inconsequential shadows of 
state power, or view international institutions solely as exogenous actors exerting 
independent force through the normative power, the rational design school instead 
attempts to accept the assumption that international institutions are a manifestation 
yielded by the rational and purposive interactions among states and other international 
actors in order to solve specific problems.46 Meanwhile, the work from Robert 
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy, has offered an analysis of the efficiency reasons for reaching agreements 
among regime participants and seeks to illuminate that international organizations and 
institutions could be seen as means for states to overcome problems, including 
collective action, information deficits or asymmetries and high transactions costs.47 
This strand of argument largely displays the overall assumption of a rational choice 
approach that suggests agents are instrumentally rational and self-interested, acquire 
consistent preferences, maximize expected utility, and make decisions based on 
cost-benefit calculation (and/or strategic reasoning).48 Following this logic, Coleman 
                                            
46 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. International 
Organization, 55(4), p762. 
47 Keohane, R. O., 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. pp.85-109. 
48 See Eriksson, L., 2011. Rational Choice Theory: Potential and Limits. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p.17. 
and Martinez-Diaz, L., 2009. Boards of directors in international organizations: A framework for understanding 
the dilemmas of institutional design. Review of International Organizations, 4(4), p.384. 
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has provided a comprehensive but nuanced understanding to argue that the principal 
aim of the rational choice approach is to understand how actions that are reasonable 
or rational for actors can combine to generate social outcomes, encompassing the 
variance of both intention and unintention by actors, and both socially optimal and 
non-optimal.49 
    Drawing from the aforementioned, these insights provide a good theoretical 
angle to shed light upon underlying rationales and accounts contributing to China’s 
choice of initiating and establishing the AIIB as a new MDB in the existing financial 
architecture at this juncture of time. Whereas, it’s of importance to have a revisit and 
appraisal of actual outcomes and characteristics of the Bank’s institutional design, to 
further probe whether the institutional design has achieved an optimal/non-optimal 
outcome contingent upon specific contexts and accounts.  
    Grounded in rational choice approach, Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal have 
conducted pioneering forays into explaining the rational design of international 
institutions, which further provide more critical and applicable theoretical toolkits to 
analyze the Bank’s institutional design. To start with, Koremenos et al. define 
international institution as “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international 
actors that prescribe, proscribe and/or authorize behavior”.50 Five dimensions of 
institutional design encompassing membership rules (Membership), scope of issues 
covered (Scope), centralization of tasks (Centralization), rules for controlling the 
institution (Control), and flexibility of arrangements (Flexibility), functioning as 
lenses of investigating variance or similarity of different institutional designs.  
    Prior to comprehensively illustrating the varied dimensions of institutional 
design, some independent variables are identified beforehand, namely, distribution 
problems (Distribution); enforcement problems (Enforcement); number of actors and 
the asymmetries among them (Number); and uncertainty about behavior, the state of 
the world, and others’ preferences (Uncertainty). 51  Meanwhile, a series of 
conjectures are particularly framed to connect independent and dependent variables 
                                            
49 Coleman, J.S., Farraro, T.J. Introduction, in: J.S. Coleman and T.J. Farraro, ed.1992. Rational Choice Theory: 
Advocacy and Critique. California: SAGE. pp. ix-xxii. 
50 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., 2001. p.763. 
51 Ibid., pp.773-779. Distribution problem refers to selecting one outcome from a range of known possible 
outcomes; Enforcement problem refers to the strength of individual actors’ incentives to cheat on a given 
agreement or set of rules; Number of actors refers to the actors that are potentially relevant to joint welfare 
because their actions affect others or others’ actions affect them; Uncertainty encompasses the extent to which 
actors are not fully informed about others’ behavior and preferences, and states’ knowledge about the 
consequences of actions of their own, other states and international institutions.  
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outlined above, on the basis of four assumptions that are explicitly or implicitly drawn 
from rational choice approach. 
“Assumption 1 Rational design: States and other international actors, acting out of 
self-interest, purposefully design institutions in the advancement of joint interests.  
Assumption 2 Shadow of the future: The value of future gain is a strong incentive for a 
cooperative arrangement. 
Assumption 3 Transaction cost: Establishing and participating in the international 
institutions is costly.  
Assumption 4 Risk-aversion: States possess risk-averse characteristics and 
acknowledge the potential adverse effects upon creating or modifying the 
international institutions.”52  
    These four underlying and interconnected assumptions largely exhibit the overall 
assumption of rational choice in an agents’ volitional characteristics and capability to 
make decisions and act upon the basis of rational calculations of costs and benefits, as 
denoted by the core insights provided by Terry Moe, “economic organizations and 
institutions are explained in the same way: they are structures that emerge and take 
the specific form they do because they solve collective action problems and thereby 
facilitate gains from trade”,53 which further illustrates that rational choice entails a 
process of consciously designing institutions, in which maximizing utility or 
minimizing cost have taken the forms of conscious design of institution, reducing 
transaction cost, being risk-averse, and shadow of future. When taking the variance of 
institutional design into consideration, Bobrow and Dryzek offered clarification by 
arguing “design is the creation of an actionable form to promote valued outcomes in a 
particular context”,54 suggesting that the four assumptions above could contribute to 
variance of institutional designs that are contingent upon particular contexts. 
 
3.2 Four analytical concepts embedded in rational institutional design 
In the light of the independent variables and key assumptions, four of the five 
dimensions of institutional design combined with their respective junctures which are 
of thematic theoretical importance central to the thesis, are attentively elaborated in 
                                            
52 Ibid., pp.781-782. 
53 Moe, T.M., 1990. Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organizations. Special Issue, pp.217-18.   
54 Bobrow, D.B., Dryzek, J.S., 1987. Policy Analysis by Design. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh. p.201. 
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this section. This thesis doesn’t exhaustively include all the five dimensions as 
analytical concepts due to the fact that, while flexibility is significantly manifested by 
the Bank’s preparatory stage, which involves “reflection upon the lessons from 
somewhere and a willingness to borrow those lessons where appropriate”,55 the 
flexibility of creating the Bank by drawing lessons and good practices from the 
existing international financial lenders is of more value to investigate the specific 
institutional arrangements inside the Bank. 
 
3.2.1 Membership 
Membership rules largely determine who enjoys the right to benefit and who pays the 
costs from an institution at the same time. Membership rules may work in several 
different ways, going beyond simply the reduction or enlargement of membership 
size. The members’ homogeneity and asymmetry could be highly influenced by 
setting criteria for inclusion or exclusion, which may play a crucial role by way of 
generating various patterns of interactions and consequences.56 Moreover, there are 
three conjectures attached to investigate the internal dynamics in advancing the 
analysis of membership.57  
    Thus, the main conjectures in relation to membership could be summarized as 
follows: actors feel more incentive to join the club to enjoy the benefits of 
cooperation only confined to members. And membership could play a positive role 
for states to learn more about the preferences when certain actions, such as 
(un-)cooperation and (non-)compliance, could be clearly distinguished by the 
membership mechanism. Last, the expansion of membership will mediate 
distributional problems in the manner of extending possibilities for potential 
trade-offs amongst the members, which is also echoed by motivational complexity, 
one desirable principle of institutional design framed by Goodin, to denote ‘goodness 
of fit’’ of accommodating the admixture of motives of different agents.58   
                                            
55 Goodin, R.E., 1996. Institutions and Their Design, in: R.E. Goodin, ed. 1996. The Theory of Institutional 
Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.42.  
56 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., 2001. p.770. 
57 Ibid., 783-784. 
58 Goodin, R.E., 1996. p.41. 
Membership 
Conjectures 
Restrictive membership increases with the severity of the enforcement problem 
Restrictive membership increases with uncertainty about preferences 
Inclusive membership increases with severity of the distribution problem 
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3.2.2 Scope 
    In the context of rational institutional analysis, scope issue does not come as 
naturally pre-packed and well-defined units, instead it goes through the process of 
deliberate construction and gradual evolution, against the backdrop of states’ 
deliberate choices to include or exclude certain issues in the institutional framework.59 
Notice that this is not simply to assert that the importance of the technological, 
cognitive-ideational, and other factors is not acknowledged here, by acquiring a more 
thorough understanding, this thesis refers to bounded rationality to offer a reflexive 
thought, embodying China’s own cognitive constraints, and the complexities and 
underlying structures of environment, for acquiring a better understanding of the 
Bank’s design outcome. Despite that, the scope dimension provides a good entry 
point to elaborate why certain issues are incorporated while others are not, and how 
different issues could produce different patterns of linkage within institutions. In this 
regard, scope conjectures concerning heterogeneity of actors, distribution and 
enforcement problems are presented.60 
    In conclusion, the scope conjectures suggest that the homogeneity of members 
will contribute to common vision, interests and position on certain limited issues, and 
vice versa, the heterogeneity within the group will possibly generate more diverse 
interests, alternatives and linkages for new scope issues or arrangements. In addition, 
the enforcement problem is closely related to the linkage and the incentives within 
and among issues. Another relevant principle of revisability is the embodiment of 
flexibility in the process of learning by doing and gradually evolving over the time,61 
which indicates the possibility of the gradual evolution of issue scope. 
  
3.2.3 Centralization 
It’s worthy to clarify that centralization is not necessarily synonymous with 
centralized enforcement. There are more vital facets, such as centralization of 
                                            
59 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., 2001. pp.770-771. 
60 Ibid.,785-786. 
61 March, J.G., and Olsen, J. P. 2006. The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. The 
American Political Science Review, 100(4), p.745. 
Scope 
Conjectures 
Issue scope increases with greater heterogeneity among larger numbers of 
actors 
Issue scope increases with severity of distribution problem 
Issue scope increases with severity of enforcement problem 
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disseminating information, reduction of bargaining and transaction costs along with 
enhanced enforcement that could be embodied and taken into consideration of 
centralization lens.62 There are four conjectures in relation to centralization as 
follows.63 
    In conclusion, the centralization conjectures suggest centralized information has 
the potential to offer an alternative for reducing the uncertainty about the behavior 
and increasing the efficiency of decentralized cooperation.64 On a macro level, joint 
efforts of gathering and pooling information will be necessary to put forward among 
actors to ease the uncertainty in terms of the consequences of their actions in a global 
setting. To cope with the uncertainty about behavior, a Kantian-inspired publicity 
principle is framed by Goodin, to elaborate it as a litmus test to see whether 
institutions and institutional actions are publicly defensible.65 With the increase of 
numbers of membership, centralization may play a positive role in reducing the 
transaction cost in terms of coordinating operational efforts and decision making.66 
Despite centralization’s efforts to alleviate cooperation problems, largely aggravated 
by the uncertainty and number issues, enforcement problems still exist in the form of 
resorting to unilateral defection, rather than reciprocity-based cooperation. Therefore, 
centralization is further needed to exert more significant leverage to members within 
the institution.  
 
3.2.4 Control 
Acknowledging the characteristic of centralization, it is noteworthy to distinguish 
control from centralization since control and centralization do not necessarily entail a 
process of mutual influence. Investigation of control is more geared towards internal 
lenses. Considering this, Koremenos et al. have particularly emphasized voting 
                                            
62  Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. in: B. 
Koremenos, C.Lipson, and D.Snidal, ed. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, pp.11-12.  
63 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., 2001. pp. 787-789. 
64 Axelrod, R., Keohane, R. O., 1986. Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. in: K. 
Oye ed.1986. Cooperation Under Anarchy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp.226-54. 
65 Goodin, 1996. p.42. 
66 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., 2001. p.788. 
Centralization 
Conjectures 
Centralization increases with uncertainty about behavior  
Centralization increases with uncertainty about the state of the world 
Centralization increases with number 
Centralization increases with severity of the enforcement problem 
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arrangements as one of the most observable and vital aspects of control.67 Three 
conjectures regarding the individuality and asymmetry of control are presented 
below.68 
    To conclude, it is arguable that with enlargement of membership, the leverage of 
individual members could be decreased for achieving collective consensus and 
benefits. Meanwhile, different members’ contribution to the institution may vary a lot 
contingent upon their unbalanced capacities, thus more sway (asymmetry of control) 
will be presented in the voting arrangement.69 In addition, members are risk-averse, 
and veto power is a special design feature to guarantee more protection in the face of 
uncertainty.70  
 
Figure 2. Relationships Between Independent Variables and Four Applicable 
Dimensions of Institutional Design Connected by Conjectures 
Source: Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., 2001. The Rational Design of 
International Institutions. International Organization, 55(4), pp.761-799. 
 
                                            
67 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., 2001. p.12. 
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70 Ibid.  
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CHAPTER 4 RATIONAL DESIGN OF THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENT BANK(AIIB) 
 
4.1 Rational design of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB) 
4.1.1 Membership 
The AIIB’s membership is open to members of the World Bank(IBRD) or ADB. For 
applicants that are “not sovereign or not responsible for the conduct of its 
international relations, application for membership in the Bank shall be presented or 
agreed by the member of the Bank responsible for its international relations.”71 These 
membership rules in the AIIB present a ‘change-through-continuity’ characteristic, a 
combination of continuity and change at the same time. In comparison with IMF and 
World Bank, whose memberships are strictly confined to “countries”, the AIIB 
exhibits continuity in conforming to respecting ‘sovereign countries’, while 
representing change in providing possible membership opportunities for a ‘territorial 
entity’. Compared with ADB, the Bank’s continuity side is manifested by the 
possibility in nature for a non-sovereign entity to be a member while acknowledging 
the importance of sovereignty, while the change aspect is reflected by the scope of 
allowing that possibility of admission to membership. Specifically, that possibility in 
ADB is restrictively confined to the associate members of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (UNECAFE),72 such as ‘Hong 
Kong, China’ , ‘Macao, China’, French Polynesia, etc. By contrast, AIIB doesn’t 
exclude that possibility of admission to membership to any specific 
regional/international institution or agency, signifying its inclusiveness of going 
beyond the limitations of fixed geographical classification and institutional affiliation 
for applicants that are not sovereign or cannot hold responsibility for their conducts of 
international relations.   
    This special membership rule in the AIIB, presented through a 
change-through-continuity characteristic, has the potential to enlarge its membership 
diversity and heterogeneity, in the context of not only being restricted to countries, 
therefore providing a possible opportunity for a territorial entity to join AIIB, 
                                            
71 AIIB, AOA, Article 3. 
72  ADB, AOA, Article 3, the name of United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East(UNECAFE) was officially changed as U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific(UNESCAP) in 1974. 
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although attached conditions in tandem with sovereign countries. Nevertheless, this 
change-through-continuity feature could also potentially, or already has, generated 
political tension and controversy, thus reflecting a hidden loophole in the institutional 
design of the Bank when practiced in practical political and economic context.  
    Taiwan, taken as an example, had officially presented the letter of intent to the 
AIIB preparatory committee for being considered as a prospective founding member 
of AIIB, but was rebuffed. The points of conflict are embodied in different 
interpretations of the membership rules enshrined in the Banks’ Articles of 
Agreement (AOA). Ma Xiaoguang, the spokesman of the State Council Taiwan 
Affairs Office (SCTAO), reiterated that “through practical consultations, solutions 
will be found for Taiwan to join the bank with an appropriate identity…AIIB is an 
international multilateral development institution featuring openness and 
inclusion…Taiwan could join the AIIB despite failing to become a founding 
member.”73 This relatively soft and mediated official statement regarding Taiwan’s 
possibility of joining AIIB actually unveils a long-standing political issue in the 
cross-strait relations, that is, the status/identity of Taiwan.74 
    Taiwan intended to apply for the AIIB membership according to the first clause 
of article three, “membership in the Bank shall be open to members of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the Asian 
Development”,75 since Taiwan is an official member of ADB in the name of ‘Taipei, 
China’. By contrast, from China’s official stance, Taiwan’s membership pathway for 
AIIB should be achieved under the third clause of the article three, especially 
road-mapping the prospective membership for those applicants who don’t fall into the 
classification of sovereign countries. Tension and concern for this issue was 
straightforwardly expressed in the remarks delivered by Hua Chunying, 
spokeswoman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), “as for Taiwan joining the AIIB, 
we maintain that we should avoid the ‘two Chinas’ and ‘one China, one Taiwan’ 
                                            
73 SCTAO,2016. Mainland to consider all-around opinions on Taiwan’s identity in AIIB. [online] Available at: 
<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201504/t20150415_9584523.htm> [Accessed 15 March 2017]. 
74 Taiwan is not a member of the IMF or the World Bank due to Chinese objections, but it is included in APEC 
(because APEC is defined as a grouping of Pacific economies rather than countries.) Unless the AIIB members 
are defined using similar language, Taiwan’s participation won’t get off the ground. The International Olympic 
Committee refers to it as ‘Chinese Taipei’, and it is known as the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at the World Trade Organization. It is a member of the ADB under the name 
‘Taipei, China’, while officially the government refers to itself as the Republic of China. 
75 AIIB, AOA, Article 3. 
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situation.” 76  Therefore, China’s official line stood in contrast with Taiwan’s, 
characterized by its attempt to participate in the international organizations under the 
name Taiwan or Republic of China(ROC), or ‘Chinese Taipei’ as the bottom line. 
Officials of Taiwan clearly stated that Taiwan should be treated with equality and 
dignity, and would not accept the arrangement of applying for AIIB membership 
through China’s Ministry of Finance(MOF).77 This underlying conflict point actually 
reveals that the Bank’s membership design is not only a financial platform of 
addressing economic issues, but also an arena of exerting politics, power and 
leverage.  
    The change-through-continuity characteristic is also presented by the nuance in 
defining ‘region’ or regional members, especially in relation to AIIB and ADB, since 
they are self-positioned as regional multilateral development bank (MDBs). For AIIB, 
the term ‘region’ and ‘Asia’ is expected to comprise the geographical regions and 
composition classified as Asia and Oceania by the U.N., while the term ‘region’ for 
ADB draws reference to the UNECAFE. This definition difference is further reflected 
in the membership classification. Take Turkey for example, which falls into the 
category of regional member in AIIB but non-regional member in ADB. Considering 
the definition difference, it may generate a long-term ramification for the membership 
of AIIB, which takes a rather broadly-embracing approach to attract more countries 
that potentially entail geographical attachment to joining a ‘regional membership’ 
club. This gesture may also potentially broaden the investment scope within the 
region, thus gradually increasing the economic homogeneity regarding the same 
pursuit of infrastructure investment and economic cooperation, in parallel with 
China’s OBOR strategy. 
    At this juncture of time, AIIB’s position itself is as a regional financial lender, 
thus its reach and influence fall short in comparison with IMF and World Bank. 
However, this doesn’t carry a pessimistic tone for its potential development. Another 
interesting aspect to note, as showed by Map 1, is that the distribution of AIIB’s 
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<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/04/14/2003615878 > [Accessed 12 April 2017]. 
  Cheng, T. F., 2016. Taiwan rejects joining AIIB under China's supervision, Nikkei Asian Review, [online] 13 
April 2015. Available at: 
<http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Taiwan-rejects-joining-AIIB-under-China-s-s
upervision> [Accessed 12 April 2017].  
 30 
membership is quite broad compared with the more Asia-Pacific oriented ADB, with 
its gravity of membership adjacent to Eurasian heartland.78 Meanwhile, AIIB’s 
membership showcases the diversity and heterogeneity of bodies represented, 
implying the chance of taking a gradual path of advancing the Bank from being 
regional-oriented, ultimately towards a cross-regional institution with international 
forward-looking vision and clout. The current membership also demonstrates that 
AIIB has taken a rather inclusive stance to absorb prospective members. In 
consideration of these facts, some attention should thus be diverted to the distribution 
problem along with the increasingly diverse or competing preferences and 
expectations from members. Therefore, the reliability and efficiency of the 
membership rules will be largely premised on the ongoing and forthcoming operation 
of the Bank to further coordinate and integrate the according demands and practical 
projects into a unified force for fulfilling the promises of the Bank.   
 
Map 1. AIIB Membership 
Source: AIIB; Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at 
Austin. 
 
4.1.2 Scope: Infrastructure Investment 
The issue scope of AIIB is clearly confined in its founding documents which set out 
the specific purposes and functions for which the Bank was established. According to 
                                            
78 Wan, M., 2016. p.76. 
 31 
Article 1 of its AOA, the purposes of the Bank include the advancement of 
sustainable development, wealth creation and improvement of infrastructure 
connectivity in Asia, promotion of regional cooperation and partnership through 
collaborating with other development institutions.79 More concretely, to implement 
these purposes, the Bank is expected to provide sovereign and non-sovereign finance 
for developing sound and sustainable projects in infrastructure and other productive 
sectors, including rural infrastructure and agriculture development, energy and power, 
environmental protection, transportation and telecommunications, water supply and 
sanitation, urban development and logistics.” 80  Notably, there is a commonly 
prevalent practice in the Fund, World Bank and ADB, namely, these international 
institutions have gradually extended their issue scope, and performed a range of tasks 
that were not foreseen at the time of their establishment, therefore their respective 
roles have been gradually changing and adapting as time evolves. Put differently, 
though circumscribing the explicit goals to a few well-defined issues in their founding 
documents, their issue scopes have been gradually adapting to new circumstances and 
incorporating new issues in the old framework, and inevitably there exists a certain 
spectrum of deviation from its original mandate and purposes.  
    Taking World Bank for example, the IBRD’s AOA straightforwardly outlines 
five purposes, namely, assisting reconstruction and development, fostering private 
foreign investment, promoting balanced growth of trade, arranging loans for more 
useful and urgent projects, and bringing about a smooth transition from a wartime to a 
peacetime economy.81 However, the purpose and issue scope of World Bank seems 
to be geared more towards alleviating poverty through the supply of technical and 
financial support, thus progressively expanding from the original mandate to 
encompass new areas and issue scopes.82 This evolution of the issue scope of the 
World Bank has been criticized constantly for its ‘mission creep’ by expanding 
towards issues and agendas such as biodiversity and corruption, in the pursuit of 
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80 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB), 2017. Our Work. [online] Available at:  
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<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/IBRDArticlesOfAgreement_links.pdf> 
[Accessed 05 March 2017]. 
82 Wounters, J., Odermatt, J., 2014. Comparing the Four Pillars of Global Economic Governance: A Critical 
Analysis of the Institutional Design of the FSB, IMF, World Bank, and WTO. Journal of International 
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incrementally democratic and humanistic agendas without appearing to be politically 
intrusive.83 In light of the fact that many organizations have experienced a natural 
evolution over time, the Bank’s scope through highlighting infrastructure as its core 
mission, demonstrated by its preamble and objectives in the AOA, seems to be a 
practical entry point to make the Bank operative without covering a systematically 
grand agenda like World Bank, particularly at the Bank’s initial stage of development.  
    Besides the rationale of smoothly and efficiently running the Bank with its 
limited issue scope, there is another question of significance to be raised; why 
infrastructure investment in particular? As indicated by the previous research, there 
are some paramount, pragmatic and reasonable factors standing out to be articulated 
for setting up the infrastructure investment as the focal point of the Bank. 
    To begin with, there is a widely held consensus to accommodate the fact that 
infrastructure development plays a vital role in promoting economic growth and 
social development and there is indeed an infrastructure investment deficit in Asia.  
    In the light of this reality, the establishment of the Bank, functioning as a 
multilateral financial institution on infrastructure development, will largely mobilize 
the resources to deal with the financing bottlenecks and infrastructure deficit. This 
argument is highly proven to be appropriate and logical by the consistency of the 
ADB reports. In 2009, ADB and the ADB Institute had projected infrastructure needs 
for developing Asia from 2010 to 2020 in the report of Infrastructure for a Seamless 
Asia, covering thirty-two of ADB’s forty-five developing member countries in 
relation to four infrastructure sectors, namely, transport, power, telecommunications, 
and water supply and sanitation. At the foremost, this comprehensive report projected 
that total investment needs for the infrastructure sectors was estimated to reach 
slightly above $8 trillion over the next eleven-year period, almost $750 billion a 
year.84 The new report Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs published in 2017, has 
updated these estimates on the basis of the 2009 version, and two sets of infrastructure 
investment needs are presented: 1) Taking into account the costs of mitigation and 
adaption, developing Asia will need to invest $26 trillion over the fifteen-years from 
2016 to 2030, almost $1.7 trillion per year; and 2) Removing climate-adjusted costs, 
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the infrastructure needs will amount to $22.6 trillion, almost $1.5 trillion per year.85 
    Under the dome of this known fact, this infrastructure investment deficit has 
marked a contrast with China’s economy situation during the aftermath of the 2008 
global financial crisis. China’s growth has decelerated due to the global financial 
crisis of 2008. As a counter-crisis solution, the Chinese central government has 
resorted to the expansion of public investment, amounting to CNY4 trillion, and 
easing monetary policy. This policy has generated side effects; scilicet domestic 
over-investment, excess capacity and excess credit. Among them, excess capacity has 
been massive, thus standing out even measured by Chinese standards, especially in 
the infrastructure productive sectors including steel and cement.86 Since Xi assuming 
leadership, China has officially admitted its entry into a new normal of Chinese 
economy,87 as a response, in-depth structural reforms have to be embarked upon to 
reduce the over-investment, excess capacity and excess credit problems to aim for a 
relatively balanced, and sustainable economic growth.88  
    At this critical juncture in time, expanding the external demand, through AIIB’s 
operation as the financial pillar situated in China’s grand OBOR strategy, may be 
utilized as a sensible and pragmatic outlet to further integrate the domestic dynamics 
and external infrastructure demands for the sake of deepening domestic 
market-oriented reform. This provides economic stimulus for infrastructure 
enterprises going global, optimally utilizing the industrial overcapacity and excessive 
foreign exchange reserve, while at the same time accommodating the infrastructure 
demands in the Asian developing economies.89 This outlet is also proven to be doable 
and appropriate in line with Chinese development lessons, setting infrastructure 
building as a top priority and foundation for the national economic growth. 
Nevertheless, it’s impossible to depict an exhaustive picture of the multi-layered 
rationales for limiting the issue scope to infrastructure investment, but it still sheds 
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light upon the issue by offering a logical demand-supply analysis against the 
backdrop the mutual dynamics of Chinese domestic economy and the greater regional 
economic landscape.    
    There is another important question concerning the future expansion of the issue 
scope of the Bank which is also an intriguing thing to be tentatively reflected upon. Is 
it likely the AIIB will take the same development path of World Bank and ADB to 
incorporate more dimensions of social development, going beyond simply financing 
the real economy in infrastructure and productive sectors? The outlook still remains 
unclear at the moment, whereas at least, it’s optimistic to argue that the resilience of 
the Bank’s continuous support for infrastructure development and enhanced 
interconnectivity in Asia will not get stagnated in a purely economic dimension, due 
to the fact that the Bank has established its own Environmental and Social Framework 
(ESF) to better achieve environmentally and socially sustainable development 
outcomes. More specifically, the Bank has acknowledged the significance of social 
development and inclusion, for sound development.90 It’s also notable that social 
development and inclusion, in the sense of empowering people with equity of 
opportunity to participate in and benefit from the development process, are in a 
manner consistent with and contingent upon local conditions.91  This statement 
actually leaves ample room for contestation and different interpretations regarding 
what the explicit indicative criteria of social development and inclusion outlined in 
the Bank are.  
    In light of the aforementioned, the issue scope of the Bank remains very much ‘a 
work in progress’. At its initial stage of development, the Bank will be likely to solely 
focus on infrastructure investment while acknowledging the importance of 
environmental and social sustainability, social development and inclusion, by virtue 
of the fact that the current homogeneity of members in the context of facing daunting 
infrastructure demands, creating mutual economic interests and sharing common 
visions for cooperation and development. This current issue scope will be likely to be 
broadened or deepened when future conjectures arise to increase the heterogeneity of 
the membership along with the pursuit of more diverse interests and agendas, which 
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could potentially generate more leverage and linkage to invite new issues or 
arrangements in. 
 
4.1.3 Centralization  
In order to probe the centralization issue, it is vital to revisit the organization and 
management in the AOA, since it contains most of the transparent information 
regarding elements of centralization, such as reduction of bargaining and transaction 
costs and enhanced enforcement.  
    The change-through-continuity characteristic is exhibited by the organizational 
structure of AIIB. Compared with the Fund, World Bank and ADB, the Bank also 
adopts a similar governance structure as illustrated by Figure 3, composed of three 
layers of structure, namely a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors and the 
President and bank management team. More specifically, the highest decision-making 
body under the Articles of Agreement lies in the Board of Governors, where all the 
powers of the Bank are vested, consisting of one governor and one alternative 
governor who shall be appointed by each member country. The Board of Directors is 
responsible for the general direction of the operations of the Bank; exercising all the 
powers that have been delegated by the Board of Governors, encompassing approval 
of the Bank’s strategy, annual plan and budget, establishment of policies, 
decision-making regarding operations of the Bank, supervision of the management 
and operation of the Bank.92 According to the AOA, the Board of Directors is 
composed of twelve members, among whom there are nine elected by regional 
members and three elected by non-regional members.93 Furthermore, the distribution 
of regional and non-regional directors is anchored in a constituency system, which is 
commonly used for the representation of members in virtually similar ways among 
the Fund, World Bank and ADB. 
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Figure 3. Organizational Structure of AIIB 
Source: AIIB  
    Although AIIB has largely followed this typical organizational structure, 
commonly adopted by MDBs, the Bank also presents certain spectrum of change. 
Firstly, the board of directors of the Bank seems to have more limited power than 
those of the Fund, World Bank and ADB, since it will “function on a non-resident 
basis except as otherwise decided by the Board of Governors by a super majority 
vote”.94 Compared with the Fund, World Bank, and ADB, the most influential 
member states, such as the U.S. and Japan, are represented by their respective resident 
executive directors in the executive board (or Board of Directors), which provides a 
platform for the executive directors’ active involvement in terms of voting on new 
policies, major programs and project decisions on a day-to-day basis. The 
in-residence board directors may also generate important leverage towards the 
management and the lending decisions of the institution as well. The rationale for a 
non-resident board in AIIB is to strive for cutting costs, improving efficiency, and 
streamlining the decision-making processes that have been often slowed down by the 
resident boards, which usually produce a certain level of confusion and tension with 
the management over day-to-day operations, and further plays a negative part in its 
due role in strategic direction and overall performance within an institution.95 This 
arrangement is also seen as contestable, potentially weakening the role of the major 
shareholders at AIIB and thereby largely strengthening the power of the Bank’s 
management. Furthermore, the operations and loan decisions of the Bank are likely to 
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be largely influenced by China, who is the dominant shareholder and country of 
origin for the first president, and possesses the venue for the bank’s headquarters, 
thereby playing a multi-functional role in the Bank. In this sense, the non-resident 
board is considered to be a purposive vehicle for advancing China’s interests.96 This 
contestation about the non-resident board actually reveals a commonly held belief in 
China and other developing countries that a leaner AIIB could be a good trial for 
accommodating both good safeguards and efficiency by drawing lessons from the 
existing MDBs. This particular arrangement actually echoes one statement of 
Zedillo’s Report, titled Repowering the World Bank for the 21st Century, “delegation 
would also increase accountability by eliminating the conflict of interest inherent in 
the Board’s co-managerial role and by placing responsibility for financing operations 
unambiguously on the shoulders of Management.”97 This further reveals a pervasive 
and confusing abundance of co-managerial practice roles by the resident board, which 
is argued to have been attempting to function an ‘impossible trinity’ of roles, 
embodying the representation of the interests of member nations, fulfilment of 
responsibility for bank policy, and provision of oversight of those same policies.98 
    Viewing from a macro level, the arrangement of the non-resident board highly 
reflects the co-constitution of centralization and de-centralization. For the 
de-centralization side, the non-resident board has clearly defined the due roles of the 
Board of Governors, Board of Directors, and Management under the AOA. This 
settlement presents a well-defined hierarchical organizational structure with clear 
division of duty to carry out, thereby further avoiding the duty confusion and 
overlapping operations. In this regard, this arrangement contributes to the overall 
de-centralization of the institution even though the organizational structure is 
hierarchically constructed. Viewing from the micro level of management, this 
arrangement undoubtedly has strengthened its autonomy and centralization of 
accelerating decision-making in terms of proposing loans and investment decisions, 
and prompting the efficiency of implementing the approved projects.  
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    In addition, adopting a non-resident board also plays a positive role in reducing 
operating costs. David Dollar has offered a critique towards the resident board and its 
financial cost to the World Bank, arguing that an extra layer of management has 
slowed down project preparation and reduced the efficiency of the bank, with an 
operational cost amounting to $70 million annually.99 Conversely, this amount will 
be saved with the assistance of modern communications technology, as stated in 
Article 27(4), “The Board of Directors shall establish procedures whereby the Board 
can hold an electronic meeting or vote on a matter without holding a meeting.”100 
This electronic countermeasure aims for mitigating the potential downside of 
rationally designing the Bank with a non-resident board, therefore ensuring the 
effective oversight of the institution in a much leaner way. The reduction of costs also 
has been exhibited in regulating that there is no remuneration for the governors and 
alternative governors except some reasonable expenses incurred attending 
meetings.101 This clause of the Bank goes exactly in accordance with those in the 
Fund, World Bank and ADB, displaying the continuity characteristic from another 
angle. Reducing the bargaining, transaction and operational costs to its fullest forms 
has largely reflected that AIIB thus has displayed an incremental tendency towards 
centralization in running the Bank in the manner of being efficient and lean. 
    Last but not least, it’s of importance to offer a reflective thought on why AIIB 
has generally exhibited a tendency of centralization. At the outmost, the centralization 
is largely to do with the heterogeneity and uncertainty of AIIB members. Though the 
membership size of the Fund and World Bank is much larger than that of AIIB, it 
doesn’t mean the Bank’s potential hindrance is less limited, on the contrary, the Bank 
will encounter enormous challenges since the infrastructure demands will be vast 
from Asian developing countries, some of which are frustrated with the conditionality 
attached to demanding painful restructuring measures embodied by Washington 
Consensus from the existing MDBs that are largely driven by risk-averseness. In this 
regard, AIIB will confront more infrastructure demands along with the pursuit of less 
or no strings attached. For the sake of the Bank’s accountability, economic benefits 
and long-term survival, leaning towards centralization will prompt the Bank to 
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facilitate the efficiency of decision-making concerning proposing programs, issuing 
loans and implementing projects, thus effectively monitoring and mitigating the 
potential downsides of infrastructure projects with less attached conditions.  
    In addition, this centralization tendency could be interpreted as a shadow of 
China’s political economy when it is placed on a multilateral setting. According to the 
Chinese official view on AIIB, adopting the best practices from the existing MDBs 
does not mean excluding unique legacies or experiences from China’s own 
development path and its political economy. To some extent, the creation and 
operation of AIIB reveals an unforeseen and contestable connection with China’s 
official assistance, and its authoritarian rule in the domestic governance. “China’s 
development planning has been heavily influenced by the political priority of securing 
the CPC’s grip on power.” 102  The domestic logic of authoritarian rule and 
developmental thinking has generated certain leverage towards the Bank, on account 
of China being the initiator and the dominate shareholder in the Bank. More 
centralization at the management level could be utilized as a useful instrument to 
advance its latent agendas with grip on maneuverability, stability and control, though 
under the well-articulated framework of win-win cooperation.  
4.1.4 Control-Voting Arrangement 
In many international organizations such as the U.N., ‘one country, one vote’ rule 
typically represents the principle of sovereign equality of states. By contrast, in global 
economic governance, for MDBs, weighted voting is typically adopted to account for 
their relative economic size and the power of their members, allowing the countries of 
economic importance to have greater representation in the organization.103 The 
change-through-continuity characteristic is also applicable to the voting arrangement 
in AIIB, since it also adopts the weighted voting as its electoral system, despite a 
slight difference in formulas compared with those of the Fund, World Bank and ADB.   
    With respect to the Bank, the allocation of voting powers among different 
member countries is basically determined by the allocation of capital subscriptions. 
As Article 4 states, the authorized capital stock of the Bank is one hundred billion 
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United States dollars, which is divided into one million shares having a par value of 
100,000 dollars each.104  
    AIIB’s allocation of capital subscriptions across member countries is determined 
by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A combination of current U.S.-dollar GDP 
(converted at market exchange rates) and current international-dollar GDP (converted 
at purchasing power parity rates) is used for calculating the economic size of 
individual members, according capital subscriptions and voting powers. More 
specifically, a 60% weight is assigned to current U.S.-dollar GDP and a 40% weight 
to current international-dollar GDP. In light of this calculation, there is another clear 
demarcation of total subscribed capital stock by regional members and non-regional 
members, as well-stipulated by Article 5, “no such subscription shall be authorized 
which would have the effect of reducing the percentage of capital stock held by 
regional members below seventy-five percent of the total subscribed capital stock, 
unless otherwise agreed by the Board of Governors by a Super Majority vote.”105 
This 75 percent of subscribed capital stock by regional members in AIIB is 15 percent 
higher than that of ADB, stated in a similar fashion, “no such subscription shall be 
authorized which would have the effect of reducing the percentage of capital stock 
held by regional members below sixty (60) per cent of the total subscribed capital 
stock.”106 From this design difference, in contrast with ADB, who limits the shares of 
non-regional members not above one-quarter, the AIIB apparently aims to preserve 
the representation and influence of the Asian regional members states in the bank, at 
least for the initial stage of the Bank’s development.107  
Table 2. Composition of Voting Power in AIIB, IMF, IBRD, and ADB 
                                            
104 AIIB, AOA, Article 4. 
105 AIIB, AOA, Article 5. 
106 ADB, Charter, Article 5. 
107 Chin, G.T., 2016. p.14 
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Source: AOAs of AIIB, IMF, IBRD and ADB. 
 
    In view of the composition and formula of the voting power, we could largely 
see the Bank’s continuity in line with the Fund, World Bank and ADB, adopting a 
similar voting formula which encompasses the basic votes and share votes, where the 
salient changes are reflected by the percentage of basic votes in the aggregate sum of 
votes, and inclusion of founding member votes. Compared with IMF and World 
Bank, AIIB has taken a big step to increase the proportion of basic votes in the 
aggregate sum of votes, which denotes a gesture to be more progressive in pursuing a 
relatively fair representation from the fundamental level. However, the proportion of 
basic votes in the aggregate sum of votes, namely 12%, marks a retrogressive move 
compared with 20% of ADB. As a countermeasure, the Bank has put forward a 
change in the composition of the voting power by including founding member votes.  
    This change-through-continuity voting arrangement could be analyzed from 
different angles: firstly, since AIIB still positions itself as a regional MDB, it’s of 
importance to draw reference from its regional counterpart, ADB, to bring in the 
relatively sound arrangements, and also displays its novel, progressive and innovative 
aspects in comparison with the traditional Bretton Woods institutions. Secondly, the 
inclusion of founding member votes is a tactic to attract more prospective members to 
join the Bank and enlarge its clout, especially in the preparatory stage of the Bank.       
    As mentioned above, it’s interesting to further investigate how the shares of 
capital subscriptions and voting powers are played out in the Bank itself. The 
Schedule A in the Banks’ AOA has clearly presented the initial subscriptions to the 
authorized capital stock, from which we could examine different members’ capital 
subscription and voting powers. China has the dominant share of capital subscription 
at 32.3796%, along with a larger voting power at 27.8450%, followed by India 
(9.0976% capital subscription, 8.0294% voting power), Russia (7.1067% capital 
subscription, 6.3349% voting power), Germany (4.8756% capital subscription, 
4.4360% voting power), South Korea (4.0650% capital subscription, 3.7461% voting 
power) and Australia (4.0134% capital subscription, 3.7021% voting power).108 
                                            
108 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB), 2017. AIIB, Members and Prospective Members of the Bank. 
[online] Available at: <https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html> [Accessed 
20 January 2017]. 
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Astonishingly, China’s voting power has been largely improved in AIIB, compared 
with that in the Fund(6.09%), World Bank( 4.56%), and ADB (5.454%).109 This 
particular design outcome was partially contributed to by China’s strong advocacy of 
improving global economic governance to increase the representation and voice of 
emerging markets and developing countries.110 And meanwhile, it is also a matter of 
fact that other economically influential countries such as the U.S. and Japan haven’t 
joined the Bank as founding members. Deliberately or naturally, this current 
allocation of voting powers has produced a phenomenal outcome, as stated in the 2nd 
clause of Article 28, decisions involving organizational structure, membership, 
change of authorized capital, and other significant issues require a super majority 
vote, which shall represent not less than three-fourths of the total voting power of the 
members,111 thereby giving China a de facto veto. 
    The Bank’s president, Jin Liqun, has elaborated upon the actual outcome of 
China’s acquisition of veto power, owing it to China’s economic weight within 
member countries, and further expressing that China does not deliberately pursue or 
will not exercise its veto right over the Bank, and with the enlargement of the 
membership, China’s voting power will be gradually reduced and therefore the de 
facto veto power will not be retained.112 Jin’s clarification of China’s de facto veto 
power within AIIB is not without a base for it. As mentioned above, a fixed super 
majority vote has been introduced into the crucial decision-making process, 
comprising a fixed two-thirds of the number of members and representing a fixed 
three-quarters of the voting power, which is identical to World Bank and ADB. 
China’s de facto veto power will be largely restrained, due to the cost of exercising it, 
destroying the credibility and mutual trust accumulated from the preparatory stage, 
                                            
109 See Asian Development Bank, 2016. 50 Years of ADB: Improving Lives for A Better Future 2016 Annual 
Report. [online] Available at: 
<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/237881/adb-annual-report-2016.pdf> [Accessed 
25 April 2017]. 
   International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2017. International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development Subscriptions and Voting power of Members Countries. [pdf] IBRD. Available at: 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IBRDCountryVotingTable.pd
f > [Accessed 09 March 2017].  
  International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2017. IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of 
Governors. [online] Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.asp > [Accessed 22 
March 2017].  
110 MFA, 2016. Keynote Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, at the Opening 
Ceremony of the B20 Summit. [online] Available at: 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1396112.shtml> [Accessed 16 March 2017].  
111 AIIB, AOA, Article 28. 
112 Fu, J., 2016. AIIB chief rules out China veto power, China Daily, [online] 27 January 2016. Available at: 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-01/27/content_23265846.htm> [Accessed 15 April 2017]. 
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outside perceptions about China and the Bank’s long-term operation and survival. In 
addition, there is a possible scenario in which the Bank’s inclusion of the U.S. and 
Japan will likely change the allocation of subscribed capital and voting shares, 
possibly diluting China’s voting power to 20.5% without retaining veto power, and 
therefore better balancing the representation and authority structure of the Bank.113 In 
this regard, China’s individual control and overall asymmetry of control within the 
Bank will be largely reduced and rebalanced. 
 
4.2 ‘China’s Status: A Revisionist Reformist’ in AIIB’s Institutional Design  
As a foreword, it is not arguable and compelling to simply assert that AIIB is another 
made-in-China product, based in China and inundated with Chinese techniques, 
values and norms. Rather, it is to say that China has played an irreplaceable role in 
underpinning the institutional design of the AIIB and its policy, thus China’s role 
should not be underestimated. In the light of China’s multi-functional roles in the 
Bank, it is of significance to probe into the connectivity between China’s status as a 
revisionist reformist and the Bank’s institutional design, to explore in what way the 
Bank’s institutional design acts as a channel for China to articulate its values, norms 
and agendas.   
 
4.2.1 Non-conditionality and International Character  
China’s status being a revisionist reformist has been largely reflected by its emphasis 
on non-conditionality and international character of the Bank. The purposes and 
functions of the Bank are set out in a very specific, exhaustive and transparent manner, 
making no mention of political goals, but instead highlighting the Bank’s 
international character in Article 31; to refrain from all attempts that may potentially 
prejudice, limit, deflect or alter the Bank’s purpose and functions, and only economic 
considerations shall be relevant to the Bank’s decisions.114 This special mention of 
the international character of the Bank, featured by non-political strings attached and 
full respect to the originally economic purpose, also exhibits itself as a 
change-through-continuity feature extended on non-conditionality, at least as manifest 
in the form of the original founding documents. 
                                            
113 Kawai, M., 2015. p.15. 
114 AIIB, AOA, Article 31.  
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    The continuity side is reflected by its exhaustive and well-defined purposes as 
they are manifest in their respective founding documents, in which all of them share a 
common characteristic of not mentioning more ‘political aims’ such as promoting 
democracy and practicing rule of law, while explicitly mentioning its due attention to 
economy and efficiency in accordance with the purposes of the institution themselves.  
Article III of IBRD’s AOA clarifies one of the principles of the use of loans: 
“(b) The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only 
for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to considerations of 
economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or 
considerations.”115 
And Article 14 of the ADB Charter also states one of the operating principles: 
 “(xi) The Bank shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the proceeds of any loan made, 
guaranteed or participated in by the Bank are used only for the purposes for which the loan was 
granted and with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency.”116 
    Though manifest in the founding documents, stringent conditionality is now and 
then practiced by the Fund and World Bank, such as IMF structural adjustment 
policies on the basis of free market neoliberal principles. The conditionality imposed 
by the Fund and World Bank has received many criticisms, as argued by Joseph 
Stiglitz; conditionality is initially designed to increase the likelihood of the loans 
being paid back by recipient countries, but has incorporated more forceful conditions, 
therefore turning loans into a policy tool that further goes beyond economic sector 
into areas which properly belong in the realm of politics.117 China is opposed to 
conditionality and is deeply concerned with political threats towards China’s 
long-term interests either nationally or globally, adamantly espousing a view that 
borrower nations’ sovereign rights should not be treated as a bargaining chip for 
doing business with the Fund and World Bank.118  
    Considering this, the change side is exhibited by the Bank’s more comprehensive 
and exhaustive listing of requirements for upholding the Bank’s international 
character, facilitated by extending the relevant principles from the use of loans to the 
staff of the Bank, and establishing a two-way process of both ruling out any political 
                                            
115 IBRD, AOA, Article III Section 5(b). 
116 ADB, Charter, Article 14. 
117 Stiglitz, J. E., 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents. London: Allen Lane/Penguin books. pp.44-45. 
118 Chow, D., 2016. pp.1279-1281.  
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or non-economic interference in any member and refraining from any unnecessary 
force in influencing decision-making of the staff, who are expected to owe their duty 
completely to the Bank instead of any other authority.  
    While in retrospect, China’s emphasis on non-conditionality has been long 
rooted, dating back to the foundation of People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the 
1960s, “eight principles of foreign aid” had been put forward by then Chinese Premier 
Zhou Enlai, to further elaborate the principle, purpose and impact of China’s foreign 
aid programs to African countries and better govern China’s overall foreign economic 
and technical assistance. The first two principles clearly state China’s stance in 
providing aid to other countries is based on the ‘principle of equality and mutual 
benefit’, China never acknowledges its assistance as unilateral charity but rather 
mutual aid, and meanwhile China ‘never attaches any conditions or asks for any 
privileges in its foreign aid programs’.119 
    Regarding Xi Jinping’s leadership in China, these traditionally widely held 
principles have been reaffirmed and manifested in foreign aid policy, as stated by the 
2014 China’s Foreign Aid White Paper. Principles including non-conditionality, 
mutual benefits and equality are presented by its coherence and consistency.  
 “When providing foreign assistance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing any 
political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully 
respecting their right to independently choosing their own paths and models of development. 
The basic principles China upholds in providing foreign assistance are mutual respect, equality, 
keeping promise, mutual benefits and win-win.”120 
    When further reading the white paper, the aid programs in infrastructure 
construction have been highlighted as an important element for improving the 
recipient countries’ economic development, explicitly, China has arranged a 
combination of grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans to assist recipient 
countries with essentially needed infrastructure construction.121 By this token, the 
AIIB could be seen as s a good spot and trial to strategically combine infrastructure 
construction and the non-conditionality principle with mutual benefits. With the 
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acknowledgement of the background knowledge, it is arguable that the principle of 
non-conditionality is strongly embodied in the Bank’s institutional design and policy 
framework. 
 
4.2.2 “Democratizing” the Global Economic Governance 
As mentioned above, China has been proactively advocating for reformation of the 
existing global economic governance. More specifically, with global financial 
governance, the Bretton Woods institutions and ADB, which are largely dominated by 
G7 countries, take a reluctant stance to make necessary and adaptive adjustments to 
reflect the changing realities (the growing economic clout of the emerging economies) 
and better accommodate the expanded economic power, along with an increased 
representation and voice in the existing global economic framework.  
    With respect to China, its continuously increasing economic clout marks a stark 
contrast with the gap between its according financial power and voting power in the 
Fund, World Bank and ADB. As argued, this fact largely contributes to an increasing 
legitimacy deficit, which is further aggravated by controversial reactions to regional 
and global financial crises in the existing financial institutions. In light of this reality, 
the Board of Governors of the Fund has officially approved the 2010 Quota and 
Governance Reforms, which would generate a new realignment in the ranking of 
quota shares, allow a shift of more than 6 percent of quota shares to the dynamic 
emerging market and developing countries, and four emerging market countries 
(namely the BRICs countries) would be among the ten largest members of the 
Fund.122 In spite of the modesty of the proposed adjustment, the U.S. Congress had 
repeatedly failed to sanction the IMF governance reform until congressional approval 
in December 2015, partly due to the concerns that the deal would relatively weaken 
U.S. influence in the Fund, despite the U.S retaining the veto power with the reform 
authorized.  
    Despite the incremental voting shares taking place in a slow-paced manner, 
China’s role in both Bretton Woods institutions and ADB still remain under-valued in 
comparison with the dominant roles played by U.S. and Japan. It’s of logic and reason 
                                            
122 International Monetary Fund(IMF), 2015. IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde Welcomes U.S. 
Congressional Approval of the 2010 Quota and Governance Reforms [press release] 18 December 2015. 
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to argue that China seems to have reached a conclusion that any kind of reform of the 
existing institutions for improving the representation and voice for emerging 
economic powers would be rather difficult, due to the unwillingness, intransigence 
and vested interests from the U.S. and Japan.123  
    Partly motivated and justified by pursuing more representation and voice for 
emerging markets and developing countries, it is therefore of importance to critically 
verify this pursuit by examining how China’s being a revisionist reformist is 
manifested in the institutional design of the Bank, by way of elevating voting shares 
for emerging markets and developing countries. There are two comparisons 
conducted to see the increased voting power of same member countries (limited to 
emerging market and developing economies124) in the Bank, the Fund, IBRD and 
ADB. 
 
Comparison 1：Increased Voting Power (AIIB in comparison with the Fund, and 
IBRD)  
As presented by Figure 4, the increased voting power is calculated by measuring the 
differences between the voting power of member countries in AIIB and voting power 
in the IMF and IBRD respectively. Self-evidently, most of the increased voting power 
rates are positive, except that Saudi Arabia’s relative voting power in IBRD is larger 
than that in AIIB. The vast majority of the same emerging and developing economies 
have witnessed an increasing trend in terms of their voting power in the Bank, which 
is generally in line with China’s appeal for increasing the representation and voice of 
emerging markets and developing countries. A further investigation of the distribution 
of the increased voting power, it presents a noteworthy feature that some major 
developing economies, such as China, India, Russia and Indonesia, take the lead, 
while the rest of the developing economies’ increased voting power is rather 
minimum or limited. Thus, it denotes the fact that this new Bank is inclined to give 
more representation and voice to those major developing countries, rather than the 
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vast majority of developing countries, since their increased voting power is largely 
contributed to by the Bank’s current small membership size, which provides an 
opportunity to share the fixed pool of voting power with less competing countries. In 
this regard, with the increasing enlargement of membership in the Bank, the dynamics 
of the voting powers acquired by the vast majority of developing countries is worth 
being delved into and compared with IMF and IBRD.     
  
Figure 4. Increased Voting power of the Same Emerging and Developing 
Economies in AIIB, IMF and IBRD 
Source: AIIB, IMF and IBRD. 
 
Comparison 2：Increased Voting Power (AIIB in comparison with ADB) 
The findings as mentioned above, are further testified by Figure 5, which presents 
increased voting power by calculating the difference between the voting power of 
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member countries in AIIB and that in ADB. Generally, the increased voting powers of 
China, India, Turkey, Vietnam, and Thailand are positive, while the rest of the 
majority’s increased voting powers approach zero and negative figures. Arguably, as 
ADB’s regional counterpart, the voting power in AIIB is more tailored to increasing 
the representation and voice of some major developing economies rather than the vast 
majority of developing countries.  
    This finding does not intend to simply suggest any one-sided or arbitrary 
assessment of the overall quality of the Bank, conversely, it is to denote that the 
Bank’s allocation of the voting powers does give us a transparent, comparable and 
verifiable indication that the Bank hasn’t presented a novel practice of restructuring 
the financial architecture. It is fair to say, instead it takes on a feature of creating a 
new frame that largely subscribes to the rules of the existing game in town.  
 
Figure 5. Increased Voting power of the Same Emerging and Developing 
Economies in AIIB and ADB 
Source: AIIB and ADB. 
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4.3 Bounded Rationality: Inside and Beyond the Institutional Design of AIIB  
In light of aforementioned analysis, it is of significance to provide a self-reflexive 
revisit of the rational institutional design of the Bank. As critically discussed, the 
institutional design of AIIB has largely demonstrated a feature of 
change-through-continuity, incorporating a certain spectrum of institutional 
isomorphism, all the while displaying a certain degree of modification or variation. 
This change-through-continuity characteristic is not to say that the Bank’s 
institutional design is wholly novel and innovative. It doesn’t strictly conform to 
comprehensive rationality, which assumes that preferences are defined over the 
known and fixed outcomes where the decision maker will resort to the optimization of 
their net benefits, or subjective expected-utilities in the manner of resorting to 
choosing the alternative that yields the highest level of benefits.125 Instead, it is to say 
that the Bank’s institutional design is manifested in a fashion more geared towards the 
bounded rationality as proposed by Herbert Simon, which assumes that 
decision-makers are goal-oriented and adaptive with intended rationality, but 
occasionally fail to accomplish certain goals due to interactions between aspects of 
their cognitive architectures and the underlying structures of the environment faced by 
them.126  
    In this sense, under the rational design framework, bounded rationality provides 
an additional insight for us to critically explain why change-through-continuity is 
manifested in the institutional design of the Bank. As for the membership, the Bank 
has potentially opened it arms to embrace more prospective members that are not 
strictly restricted to sovereign countries. However, Taiwan is a witness to the Bank’s 
institutional design in the form of bounded rationality, further revealing that joining 
the Bank is simply a matter of economic accounts, and rather squinted towards an 
interplay of economy and politics mingled with power and discourse.  
    Further, the issue scope has been initially restricted to infrastructure investment, 
which could also be seen a showcase of China’s bounded rationality in utilizing its 
comparative advantage drawn from the past development, to advance its strategic 
agendas in a multilateral setting under the official framework of mutual benefits. 
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China’s cognitive conditions indicate a considerable part of the impetus for carefully 
selecting infrastructure investment as the entry point for running the Bank.     
    Another angle to investigate the bounded rationality of designing the Bank goes 
to the gap between China’s normative appeals and the outcome of the practice. 
China’s normative appeals are manifested in its advocacy of non-conditionality, 
mutual benefits and equality. However, it is worthy to note that the Chinese concept 
of equality seems to be contingent upon specific circumstances. Without any doubt, in 
political and cultural realms, China has been conforming to the principle of sovereign 
equality and non-intervention as a means to preserve uniqueness and diversity. While 
in the economic realm, as presented by Xi Jinping’s speeches, China has repeatedly 
called for improving global economic governance on the basis of equality, a concept 
that embodies reflecting new realities of the world economic landscape, increasing 
representation and voice of emerging markets and developing economies, and 
ensuring all countries have equal rights, opportunities and rules to follow in 
international economic cooperation.127  
    It indeed partially reflects the equality agenda in the Bank’s institutional design 
when seeing the increased voting shares by the developing countries compared with 
those in the Bretton Woods institutions, while it also demonstrates a certain degree of 
retrogression in comparison with ADB in terms of protecting the voting powers of the 
developing countries with minor economic importance. Objectively, this small 
retrogression is not to say a fault of inconsistency or self-contradiction due to China’s 
failure in fulfilling the normative appeals, but rather, it is overwhelmingly contributed 
to by the underlying structures in the existing international financial architecture, 
displaying a co-constitution of the economic power and invested interests. The 
change-through-continuity characteristic fundamentally reveals that a novel 
re-structuring of the existing international financial architecture is too complex to 
achieve in a short time-span, compared with a pragmatic manner of ‘bringing forth 
the new through the old’ in the practice of bounded rationality.  
    In addition, the bounded rationality, reflected by the change-through-continuity 
feature of the Bank’s institutional design, also helps us to shed light upon how to 
better understand the connectivity between the ideational appeals and practical 
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outcomes of proposed political or economic initiatives. The key is to combine the 
insights derived from both the systematic understanding of the original internal 
context and the underlying structures and complexities in the external background 
where the economic and political agendas have to reach out.   
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis has addressed the two main research questions, ‘what characteristic does 
the Bank possess regarding institutional design, in comparison with the Fund, World 
Bank and ADB?’ and ‘what role has China played in contributing to the characteristic 
of the Bank’s institutional design?’. In order to answer these two questions, using the 
rational institutional design as the theoretical framework has allowed for a more 
systematic and in-depth discussion of different aspects of the Bank’s institutional 
design and China’s corresponding roles in it.   
    Overall, this thesis has found out that change-through-continuity is a recurring 
characteristic of the institutional design of the Bank, in comparison with the IMF, 
World Bank and ADB. More concretely, with respect to membership, the Bank has 
extended its membership from strictly-defined ‘sovereign countries’ to a more 
inclusive stance, opening the membership door for applicants like a territory entity 
that is not sovereign or does not hold responsibility for its conducts of international 
relations. With respect to scope issue, the Bank has also focused on promoting 
sustainable economic and social development through cooperation, but has initially 
confined its scope issue to infrastructure investment. With regards to centralization, 
albeit following the typical three-layered organizational structure commonly adopted 
by the Fund, World Bank and ADB, the Bank has adopted a non-resident board, 
which reflects a process of co-constitution of centralization and de-centralization, but 
is more prone to centralization. Concerning voting, the Bank has followed the 
commonly used weighted voting system in the Bretton Woods institutions and ADB, 
but also adds one category of founding member votes as one constituent of the voting 
shares.   
    China, as a revisionist reformist, has played a significant role in shaping the 
Bank’s institutional design, embodying its emphasis on non-conditionality and 
international character in line with the change-through-continuity feature of the 
institutional design, and advocating for reforming global economic governance. To 
sum up, the change-through-continuity feature of the Bank’s institutional design 
largely reflects bounded rationality, which is added as a self-reflexive thought for 
better reflecting upon why especially change and continuity are reflected in the 
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Bank’s institutional design. 
 
Outlook 
As aforementioned, there are some follow-up questions to be raised. How does this 
change-through-continuity characteristic of the Bank’s institutional design influence 
the Bank’s operation and future development? Will this feature be weakened or 
strengthened when the U.S. and Japan possibly join the Bank? These intriguing 
questions are of enough value and importance to warrant in-depth future research.  
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